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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN JOHN CURRIER, ] 
Petitioner-Appellant ] 
vs. ) 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden, 
Respondent-Appellee, ] 
| REPLY BRIEF OF 
1 PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
1 Case No. 940428 
Petitioner-Appellant Stephen John Currier, through his 
volunteer counsel, submits the following Reply Brief, in addition 
to the arguments and authorities previously presented: 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP KQI^S 
The relevant text of any constitutional provisions, statutes or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues in this appeal is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
This is the second appeal from the dismissal of Petitioner-
Appellant's post-conviction petition on procedural grounds. The 
district court has twice refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
on the merits of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post-
conviction Relief, which includes claims that: trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance due to the use of undue and 
wrongful pressure to plead guilty; trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance due to an undisclosed conflict of interest 
in concurrently representing the co-defendant in the case; trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate 
the case and introduce evidence; and important incriminating 
statements had been recanted. 
Petitioner-Appellant Stephen John Currier was charged in 
Carbon County, Utah with sexual abuse of a child, a first degree 
felony. On October 3, 1988, Mr. Currier pleaded guilty to the 
lesser charge of sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony. 
(R. 142-47; 224-27). Mr. Currier's appointed lawyer was Mark 
Tanner, who also represented co-defendant Raymond Marquez. (R. 
149). 
On November 30, 1988, trial counsel filed a Verified Motion 
to Change Plea, on the basis that his investigation following entry 
of the plea indicated that Mr. Currier was innocent. (R. 149-52). 
Trial counsel relied in part upon statements of his other client, 
co-defendant Marquez. 
Mr. Currier's Motion to Change Plea was denied after a 
brief1 non-evidentiary hearing on January 3, 1989. (R. 154). At 
the hearing, trial counsel stated that: 
I believe it was my pressure that brought the 
Defendant to enter a plea, even though he stated 
in his written statement that he did it 
voluntarily. I believe he did it under pressure 
exerted by counsel, and I think at this point it 
was undue pressure, and it was wrongful pressure; 
and I should not have indicated to him or so 
advised him. 
1
 The transcript of the January 3, 1989 hearing contains less 
than four pages of proceedings, consisting of statements from the 
trial counsel, the prosecutor and the court. (R.228-33). 
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(R. 229), The trial court ruled that the guilty plea had been 
voluntarily entered, because counsel had failed to present facts to 
show that Mr. Currier "didn't know what he was doing." (R. 231). 
Immediately prior to sentencing on April 3, 1989, trial 
counsel renewed the motion to withdraw Mr. Currier's guilty plea, 
again stating that he had been wrong in advising Mr. Currier to 
enter the plea. (R. 22, 23). The district court denied that 
request, and denied leave to take an interlocutory appeal. (R. 
29). 
Mr. Currier was sentenced to a term of one to 15 years in 
the Utah State Prison. The court suspended the prison sentence and 
placed Mr. Currier on probation for 18 months, with the condition 
that he serve six months in the Carbon County Jail and 18 months on 
probation. (R. 157). 
Mr. Currier's Notice of Appeal from the denial of his plea 
withdrawal motion was timely filed on April 19, 1989. (R. 160-61). 
The Docketing Statement submitted in the direct appeal stated that 
the issues to be raised were the voluntariness of the guilty plea 
and the refusal to allow the plea withdrawal "when counsel for 
Defendant indicated that perhaps too much pressure had been applied 
to Defendant to encourage him to enter the guilty plea, and when 
new evidence and information was discovered regarding statements 
given by state witnesses." (R. 47). 
On June 7 and June 9, 1989, trial counsel filed in the 
district court and in this Court, respectively, affidavits executed 
January 27, 1989 by two persons who heard the alleged victim deny 
3 
that Mr. Currier had sexually assaulted her. (R. 163-67). On June 
21, 1989, counsel filed a Motion for Review, requesting the 
district court to decrease Mr. Currier's jail sentence to three 
months. (R. 169). After a hearing on the same date, the court 
entered the following Order, stating in pertinent part that: 
That it will amend the judgment previously entered 
that a condition of the probation be that 
defendant served 90 days in jail. The time 
already served will do with the condition that the 
appeal to the Court of Appeals be dismissed. The 
defendant will be released from custody upon 
showing that the motion to dismiss the appeal has 
been filed. 
(R. 172). 
Trial counsel immediately complied with this condition, by 
filing a Motion to Dismiss in this Court on the same day. (R. 
177). The Motion to Dismiss and its supporting Affidavit, (R. 
174), stated that the prosecution had agreed to recommend the 
waiver of Mr. Currier's additional jail term "in exchange for the 
dismissal ... of this appeal"2 and the execution of a blanket 
release of claims against Carbon County and the State. (R. 
175,177). Later that day, this Court dismissed Mr. Currier's 
appeal and issued the remittitur. (R. 180). 
2
 The State is incorrect in asserting in its Statement of 
Facts that, in dismissing his appeal, Mr. Currier knew "he was 
relinquishing all rights to litigate the merits of his claim." 
(Brief of Appellee, at 6) (Emphasis added). The Affidavit signed 
by Mr. Currier actually states that he was waiving "all rights to 
appeal the merits of his claim." (R.175) (Emphasis added). 
Litigation of postconviction claims pursuant to Rule 65B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is separate from the direct appeal 
process authorized by the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
4 
Mr. Currier was released from custody on June 26, 1989. 
(R. 185). On July 1, 1991, the trial court revoked his probation 
and ordered him to begin serving the prison sentence originally 
imposed. (R. 193). In November 1991, Mr. Currier received a copy 
of an affidavit executed by co-defendant Raymond Marquez, recanting 
statements incriminating him. Mr. Currier immediately began 
preparing a post-conviction petition pursuant to Rule 65B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Mr. Currier's Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus and Post-conviction Relief was filed on April 16, 
1992. (R. 2). 
In response, the State argued that the Petition should be 
dismissed because Mr. Currier had not complied with the filing 
deadline set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992). The 
trial court agreed and dismissed the post-conviction action. This 
Court reversed, holding that § 78-12-31.1 was unconstitutional 
under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. Curriey v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993). 
Back in the trial court, the State again sought dismissal 
of Mr. Currier's Petition, this time on the grounds that he should 
have raised his claims on direct appeal and that it failed to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted. (R. 130). On June 24, 
1994, the district court granted the State's Motion to Dismiss, 
ruling that "all of the grounds now asserted by petitioner were 
known to him before he dismissed his appeal." According to the 
3
 See Currier v. Holdenf 862 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App. 
1993). 
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court, Mr. Currier's dismissal of his appeal "against the advice of 
his counsel"4 had relinquished the claims raised in the Petition. 
(R. 260-61). 
Mr. Currier sought reconsideration, arguing that his claims 
were not barred because the lawyer who had provided ineffective 
assistance continued to represent him on direct appeal. (R. 263). 
In denying the Request for Reconsideration on July 6, 1994, the 
court concluded that the ineffective assistance claims were 
virtually identical to the claim that Mr. Currier's plea was 
involuntary and had been abandoned. (R. 271). Moreover, the fact 
that trial and appellate counsel were the same did not excuse the 
failure to raise ineffective assistance issues in the direct 
appeal. According to the court, due to trial counsel's "remarkable 
candor," "[t]here can be no question that, had petitioner proceeded 
with his appeal, that question would have been recognized and 
addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals." (R. 272). 
Notice of Appeal from this second dismissal of Mr. 
Currier's Rule 65B petition was timely filed on July 20, 1994. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE MR. CURRIER WAS REPRESENTED IN HIS DIRECT 
APPEAL BY THE SAME LAWYER WHO ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
EXIST TO EXCUSE THE FAILURE TO RAISE HIS POST-
CONVICTION CLAIMS ON APPEAL. 
4
 Although the Affidavit submitted with the Motion to Dismiss 
the appeal had stated that counsel advised against the dismissal, 
Mr. Currier alleged in the Rule 65B Petition that trial counsel 
"told petitioner to sign an [sic] plea agreement to drop the appeal 
and not sue anyone including himself, and his counsel would get him 
released from the Carbon County Jail, (R. 5). 
6 
The State correctly sets forth the law generally applicable 
to complaints that a post-conviction petition under Rule 65B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is procedurally barred. However, 
both the State and the court below disregard controlling Utah law 
which establishes that unusual circumstances in this case exist to 
allow consideration of Mr. Currier's claims despite the fact that 
they were not raised on direct appeal. 
Although the failure to include known issues in an appeal 
ordinarily bars their litigation in a post-conviction petition, the 
Utah Supreme Court "has frequently addressed and resolved the 
merits of claims asserted in petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
even though the issues raised were known or should have been known 
at the time of conviction or initial appeal." jjupst v. Cookr 777 
P.2d 1029, 1036 (Utah 1989). A court may consider a claim raised 
for the first time in post-conviction if unusual circumstances 
excuse the failure to argue the issue on direct appeal. Fernandez 
v. Cookr 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989). 
The situation in Mr. Currier's case — the allegedly 
incompetent counsel handled the trial and the direct appeal — is 
the most common one in which the unusual circumstances test is 
satisfied.5 In fact, "When trial counsel represents the defendant 
on appeal an ineffective assistance claim cannot be raised because 
5
 Mr. Currier's claim that incriminating statements have 
been recanted is another type of unusual circumstance. The 
discovery of new exculpatory evidence can be litigated in Rule 65B 
proceedings although not addressed on appeal. Hurst v. Cookf 777 
P.2d at 1035, n.6; Stewart v. State By and Through DeLandf 830 P.2d 
306, 309 (Utah App. 1992). 
7 
it is 'unreasonable to expect trial counsel to raise the issue of 
his own ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal.'" {State v^ 
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 907 (Utah App. 1994) (Emphasis added). See 
also, State v. Humphriesf 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
In attempting to avoid these rules, the State relies on the 
district court's unwarranted speculation that trial counsel here 
was so remarkably candid that he would have asserted his own 
inadequacy to allow the Court to reach the ineffective assistance 
issue on appeal. (Brief of Appellee, at 13; R.272). This line of 
conjecture is similar to that rejected by the Utah Supreme Court 
majority in Fernandez v. Cook, where the court said "the fact that 
we might have considered the claim on appeal from the resentencing 
cannot foreclose [petitioner] from pursuing a procedurally correct 
course, habeas corpus." 783 P.2d at 549, n.3 (Emphasis added). 
Assuming, arguendo, that mere speculation can be used to 
evade the bright-line exceptional circumstances exemption 
articulated in ferpandez
 f this case is not an appropriate one for 
its application. Currier v. Holden. Here, the assumption that 
trial counsel would have raised his own ineffective assistance is 
rebutted by the record. The district court and the State focused 
on the fact that trial counsel had admitted to the trial judge and 
in the Docketing Statement, that he pressured Mr. Currier into 
pleading guilty. However, these admissions in open court fell 
short of asserting that counsel provided ineffective assistance, 
and they became much more tentative in the Docketing Statement. 
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On January 3, 1989, trial counsel stated on the record that 
undue and wrongful pressure he exerted had induced Mr. Currier to 
enter the pleaf and that "I should not have indicated to him or so 
advised him." (R. 229). On April 3, 1989, counsel stated that he 
urged Mr. Currier to plead guilty based on an inaccurate prediction 
of the probation department's position on sentencing and that he 
should not have advised him to sign the plea agreement. (R. 22, 
23). In the Docketing Statement, counsel phrased the problem this 
way: Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the plea 
withdrawal "when counsel for Defendant indicated that perhaps too 
much pressure had been applied to Defendant to encourage him to 
enter the guilty plea"? (R. 47) (Emphasis added) 
Significantly, trial counsel did not ever suggest that his 
representation might have been constitutionally deficient because 
he failed to investigate the case before the plea or because he 
represented the co-defendant. Further, although the appeal was 
pending for two months, counsel did not take the opportunity to 
seek substitution of counsel. Nor is it clear that substitution 
would have been ordered if trial counsel had brought the matter to 
the Court's attention, gee ^abpumf 881 P.2d at 907, n.10. 
Alternatively, the State also contends that the failure to 
raise his claims on appeal is not attributable to the fact that 
trial counsel continued to represent him in this Court, but to the 
fact that Mr. Currier dismissed the appeal. The State, and the 
court below, have failed to recognized a factual question which is 
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crucial to this contention and which demonstrates the fundamental 
flaw in dismissing Mr. Currier's Petition without taking evidence. 
Relying on an Affidavit executed on June 21, 1989, the 
State claims that the dismissal of Mr. Currier's direct appeal 
occurred against the advice of counsel. (Brief of Appellee, at 
12). However, in his Petition, Mr. Currier alleged in pertinent 
part that: 
The petitioner's counsel filed an appeal with the 
Court of Appeals and then told petitioner to sign 
an [sic] plea agreement to drop the appeal and not 
sue anyone including himself, and his counsel 
would get him released from the Carbon County 
Jail. Petitioner signed, the appeal was dismissed 
and petitioner was released into probation. 
(R. 5). The State and the trial court have not mentioned this 
factual conflict, which can only be resolved after an evidentiary 
hearing. Other facts show that the circumstances surrounding the 
dismissal of the direct appeal were extremely unusual — Mr. 
Currier was not represented by independent counsel, but by the 
lawyer claimed to be ineffective; Mr. Currier was required to 
relinquish his right to sue the county and the State in order to 
receive the early release; and no attempt was made to seek his 
release from jail through other means, such as a stay pending 
appeal or an appeal bond. 
When the dismissal or omission of an appellate issue has 
occurred as a result of counsel's actions, or inaction, the 
defendant's claim has not been waived. Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 
619, 621 (Utah 1989); Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 
1988); Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). As these cases 
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have held, an evidentiary hearing is appropriate to resolve the 
factual conflict here and determine what actually happened when Mr. 
Currier's appeal was dismissed. 
Finally, the State argues that Mr. Currier's ineffective 
assistance claim is identical to the claim raised in his attempts 
to withdraw his guilty plea, and therefore was specifically 
discarded when his direct appeal was dismissed. According to the 
State, and to the district court, "Petitioner has simply placed a 
new label on old facts." (Brief of Appellee, at 12; see R.271). 
The belief that the two claims are identical is incorrect— 
the ineffective assistance claim is based on an entirely different 
legal theory and on additional facts. For instance, in addition to 
claiming that trial counsel improperly pressured him into pleading 
guilty, Mr. Currier alleges that trial counsel did not conduct an 
adequate investigation and that the dual representation of co-
defendant Raymond Marquez created an unconstitutional conflict of 
interest. (R. 4). Moreover, the legal bases for the two claims 
are distinct. Cf
 f r State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293 (Utah 1992) 
(Court separately treats claim that plea was involuntary because 
the defendant didn't understand the elements of the offense and 
claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to 
investigate and discuss potential defenses with the defendant). 
Mr. Currier seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of 
claims that could not have been raised on appeal, because he was 
represented by constitutionally ineffective counsel. Exceptional 
circumstances exist to allow their litigation on the merits, and 
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the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Currier's Rule 65B 
Petition. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO AFFIRM THE PETITION'S 
DISMISSAL ON A GROUND NOT DECIDED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT AND NOT BASED ON A CORRECT ANALYSIS OF 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW. 
Although the district court did not address the issue, the 
State contends that Mr. Currier's Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and Post-conviction Relief failed to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted and urges this Court to affirm its 
dismissal. Because the court below declined to reach the issue, 
this Court should as well. Moreover, the State's argument rests on 
the erroneous analysis of the law controlling two crucial 
substantive issues. 
First, the State argues that Mr. Currier is not entitled to 
relief because the trial court decided that his guilty plea was 
voluntary when it refused to allow withdrawal of the plea in 1989. 
The State mischaracterizes this argument as one asserting the 
defense of failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; in essence the State's contention 
actually is that a defendant cannot challenge a guilty plea once 
the district court has ruled that it was voluntarily entered. This 
contention is clearly incorrect. Adopting it would effectively 
insulate trial court rulings from post-conviction review although 
they are cognizable under Rule 65B as violations of the accused's 
constitutional rights. Further, the trial court's decision here 
that the plea was voluntary did not rest on full and fair 
litigation of the issue. No evidence was presented at the brief 
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hearing on January 3, 1989; trial counsel merely addressed a few 
comments to the court. When the issue was raised again prior to 
sentencing, the trial court noted that counsel had not offered any 
supporting evidence and then denied counsel's belated request for 
more time. Indeed, counsel's handling of Mr. Currier's request for 
a plea withdrawal is another instance of ineffective assistance 
justifying consideration of the Rule 65B Petition on its merits. 
Second, the State contends that Mr. Currier's pro se 
Petition does not state a claim because it does not satisfy the 
test for ineffective assistance claims under Strickland y. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). As applied to a guilty plea, the 
Strickland test requires a showing that counsel's actions and 
advice were not objectively competent and that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 
Hill Vt I^ opkh^ rt, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Apporfl, MQQre v. , United 
States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); Osborn v. ghjllinger, 861 
F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988); Persons? V, Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 
(Utah 1994). A "reasonable probability" is one which is sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome; however, it is not outcome-
determinative or equivalent to the preponderance standard of proof. 
Osborn, 871 F.2d at 626. 
In asserting that Mr. Currier failed to allege the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland ineffective assistance test, the 
State applies an overly restrictive interpretation of Hill v. 
Lockhart by requiring defendants to plead the exact words, "I would 
13 
not have pleaded guilty" if counsel had been adequate. The Court 
should not accept this narrow reading of the prejudice requirement, 
because it is not mandated by Hill and because it is unduly harsh 
when applied to Utah inmates who must draft Rule 65B petitions on 
their own, without legal training or access to necessary resources. 
Rule 65b is based on the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 
which was designed to liberalize state post-conviction proceedings 
and make them "flexible enough so that with sympathetic 
consideration of pleadings and methods of presenting issues, a 
prisoner will always be able to raise his claims in a state court." 
ffurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d at 1034 (quoting Annotation, yniform Post-
Conviction Ac1; 11 Unif.L.Ann. 477, 482 (1974)).6 With this in 
mind, the instant Petition should be compared to that in Hill. 
In Hill, the defendant claimed that counsel had incorrectly 
advised him about his parole eligibility and sought a reduction in 
his sentence to produce a parole eligibility date in line with that 
advice. 474 U.S. at 54-55. The Supreme Court's inquiry was not 
simply whether the petition included the talismanic statement that 
the defendant would have pleaded not guilty if he had been 
correctly advised about his parole eligibility. Rather, the Court 
also analyzed whether the petition "alleged [any] special 
circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed 
particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether 
* As Chief Justice Zimmerman recognized in Parsons v. Barnes, 
it defies logic to expect uncounseled and untrained prisoners to 
strictly comply with the complex legal doctrines involved in 
postconviction litigation. 871 P.2d at 530-31 (Zimmerman, C.J., 
concurring) 
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or not to plead guilty." 474 U.S. at 60. The Court additionally 
noted that the incorrect advice from counsel applied to his 
sentence after a conviction at trial as well as to his sentence 
under the plea agreement. 474 U.S at 60. Similarly, in Pjtysons v. 
games
 f of significance to the Utah Supreme Court were the facts 
that the defendant had admitted his guilt from the beginning, had 
not presented any evidence that he ever intended to go to trial and 
had not sought to withdraw his plea. 871 P.2d at 525. 
In the instant case, an allegation of prejudice can easily 
be inferred in Mr. Currier's Petition, which includes the following 
assertions: "counsel used undue and wrongful pressure to have 
petitioner into a plea agreement and plead guilty to the charges" 
(R. 3); "Petitioner told counsel that he could not plead guilty to 
something he did not do," (R. 4); and "Petitioner finally had no 
choice but to accept the alleged plea agreement," (R. 4). Mr. 
Currier continues to assert that he is innocent of the offense to 
which he pleaded guilty. This case should be remanded with 
instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing at which Mr. Currier 
would have the opportunity to present evidence demonstrating a 
reasonable probability that he would have pleaded not guilty. 
In any event, the State does not argue that another Sixth 
Amendment claim is inadequate under Rule 12(b)(6). Both the State 
and the district court have ignored the issue, although Mr. 
Currier's Petition includes the claim that trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance because he had a conflict of interest in 
representing both Mr. Currier and his co-defendant. This claim is 
15 
independent of that based on counsel's deficient performance, and 
is founded on the fundamental principle that: 
The right to counsel guaranteed by the 
Constitution contemplates the services of an 
attorney devoted solely to the interests of his 
client .... and faithful, devoted service to a 
client are prized traditions of the American 
lawyers. It is this kind of service for which the 
Sixth Amendment makes provision. And nowhere is 
this service deemed more honorable than in case of 
appointment to represent an accused too poor to 
hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a 
member of an unpopular or hated group, or may be 
charged with an offense which is particularly 
abhorrent. 
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948). Accord, e.g., 
Osborn v. Shi1linger, 861 F.2d at 624-25; State v. Holland, 876 
P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994). 
A conflict of interest claim is analyzed differently from 
that of ineffective assistance due to deficient performance. 
Osborn v. Shi1linger, 861 F.2d at 625. Significantly, a defendant 
who shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting 
interests need not demonstrate prejudice, but prejudice will be 
presumed. Cuyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980). 
Accord, e.g., United States v. Martin, 965 F.2d 839, 842 (10th Cir. 
1992); Osborn, 861 F.2d at 627. Both the State and the district 
court have ignored this claim, yet it provides an independent basis 
for post-conviction relief which must be explored at an evidentiary 
hearing. 
III. CONSIDERATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S NONCOMPLIANCE 
WITH RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IS PREMATURE, BECAUSE THE DISMISSALS OF 
HIS PETITION ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS HAVE PREVENTED 
A FULL PRESENTATION OF MR. CURRIER'S POST-
CONVICTION CLAIMS. 
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The State interprets the Brief of Appellant as including an 
argument that post-conviction relief should be granted because the 
trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in accepting Mr. Currier's guilty plea. (Brief 
of Appellee, at 9-11). The State contends that the Court should 
decline to reach this claim, and, alternatively, that Mr. Currier 
is not entitled to relief on the merits. 
Mr. Currier agrees that the Court should not address the 
merits of the Rule 11 issue. The post-conviction court explicitly 
did not decide the claim. (R. 260). The Brief of Appellant did 
not argue the merits of the claim; the State apparently has 
misinterpreted a sentence in its Statement of the Case, (Brief of 
Appellant, at 3), as asserting an argument on the merits. 
Undersigned counsel did not intend for this sentence to be 
interpreted in this manner. 
Resolution of the merits of the Rule 11 issue is premature. 
Instead, this case should be remanded to the district court, where 
Mr. Currier's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post-
conviction Relief could be supplemented with the assistance of 
undersigned counsel to include a more specific statement of his 
claims. Mr. Currier then would have the opportunity to present 
evidence to support the factual allegations in his Petition. Only 
then, with an adequate record, would review of the merits of the 
claim be appropriate. 
IV. SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS 
INAPPROPRIATE AND WOULD UNFAIRLY PUNISH MR. CURRIER FOR 
COUNSEL'S INADVERTENT ERROR. 
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The State also has asked this Court to affirm the denial of 
Mr. Currier's Petition because the Opening Brief did not include 
citations to the record, as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Brief of Appellee, at 8). 
Undersigned counsel acknowledges that the Brief of Appellant failed 
to comply with Rule 24(a)(7); his error has been corrected by 
including a complete Statement of the case in this Reply Brief. 
Counsel apologizes to the Court and to counsel for the State for 
any inconvenience caused by his mistake. 
The Court should decline the State's invitation to 
summarily affirm. Summary affirmance is not a mandatory response 
to noncompliance with Rule 24(a)(7); appellate courts merely have 
the discretion to affirm. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.f 
818 P.2d 1311, 1313, n.l (Utah App. 1991). That discretion should 
not be exercised in the instant case, because the citations 
contained in the Brief of Appellee and in this Reply Brief are 
sufficient for this Court's review. Further, Rule 2 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes suspension of the rules in 
the interests of justice. Here, summarily affirming would 
irreparably punish Mr. Currier for a procedural error attributable 
solely to counsel and not to him personally. Mr. Currier, 
throughout the history of this case, including his previous appeal, 
has been forced to rely on volunteer pro bono counsel. Moreover, 
the State suffers no prejudice from consideration of this appeal on 
its merits. 
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CONCLUSION 
Clear error occurred when the district court ruled that 
exceptional circumstances do not exist and that Mr. Currier's post-
conviction claims are barred by the failure to raise them during 
the direct appeal in which he was represented by the same lawyer 
alleged to have provided ineffective assistance. This Court must 
reverse and remand for consideration of the merits of Mr. Currier's 
Rule 65b Petition. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Petitioner-Appellee Stephen Currier requests oral argument 
of this matter. This request is supported by the facts that Mr. 
Currier is sentenced to a term of up to 15 years in the Utah State 
Prison, that he has tried unsuccessfully for more than four years 
just to have his constitutional claims considered on the merits, 
and that the district court has misinterpreted controlling 
authority clearly allowing his Rule 65B Petition to be litigated. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1995. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW [3768] 
JEFFREY H. HAGEN [6395] 
10 West 300 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I served a copy of this Reply Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellant upon counsel for the Respondent-Appellee, by 
placing the same in the United States Mail, First Class postage 
prepaid and addressed to Angela Micklos, Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on this 
day of April, 1995. 
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